PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska iholds in Gilber v. Garher, 95 N. W. io3o, that the fact that an acknowledgment
Validity

of a mortgage upon a family homestead was

taken by an officer and stockholder in a loan
company which was agent for the lender does not-invalidate the acknowledgment.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

On the death of a mortgagor, the complainant, the
mortgagee, secured a release of the widow's right of dower
mtstak.
Law

of

in the premises, and also a deed from the mort-

gagor's father, under the belief that the prop-erty descended to the latter and cancelled the mortgage.
No consideration was paid for such cancellation. In
Swedesboro Loan & Building Ass'n v. Gans, 55 Atlantic,
82, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that as
against the heirs of the mortgagor, complainant was entitled to a decree for the re-establishment and foreclosure
of the mortgage.
'CARRIERS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. Co. oj Texas v. Meek, 75 S. W. 317, that a
Libilty as
Hallt

carrier's liability as bailee for the storage of un-

claimed baggage extends only to such articles
as come within the definition of baggage, and does not include articles improperly checked as baggage. See Railroad v. Morrison,34 Kansas, 5o5.
It is a somewhat difficult question to decide to what extent the fact that a person who enters a train intends to do
Expulsion of - an illegal act at the
Pasuner
fies the employees of

end of the journey justithe railroad in refusing to

carry him. From the decision of the court in Ford v. East
Louisiana R. Co., 34 Southern, 585, it appears that the
fact that one has done an illegal act prior to his asking for
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CARRIERS (Continued).

transportation will not justify his being refused, even
though such illegal act has reference to the carrier. Thus
the court holds that a person who "scalps" railway tickets
otherwisethan on the train cannot bedenied transportation
over the lines of the railroads in whose tickets he traffics.
He is a part of the general public, and railway companies,
as common carriers, must, ordinarily, permit all who pay
the regular fare to travel on their trains. Undoubtedly the
court would reach a different conclusion where a person
would seek such transportation as a fugitive from justice.
Against the dissent of three judges, the Court of Appeals of New York holds in Monnier v. New York Cent. &
Purche of H. R. R. Co., 67 N. E. 569, that the refusal of a
Ticket
passenger, who was unable to buy a ticket because of the absence of a ticket agent, to pay the additional
fare required of passengers without tickets by a rule of the
company does not justify a forcible resistance by the passenger to his ejection for this cause by the conductor, so
that neither the company nor the conductor is liable in
damages for an assault on the passenger under such circumstances. See Bradshawv. Railroad, 135 Mass. 4o7.
The Court of Appeals of New York holds in Mairs v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 67 N. E. goi, that where a common carrier delivered goods without requiring
l of L
surrender of a bill of lading which was not indorsed "non-negotiable," as required by law, it did not authorize a subsequent bona fide transferee of the bill, which
had been fraudulently altered so as to make it negotiable,.
to sue a carrier to recover damages for its neglect, as the
forgery was not the proximate result of such neglect
CIVIL DAMAGE ACT.

It is no defence to a suit for damages growing out of the
traffic in intoxicating liquors to show that others furnished
Intoxicating
liquors that contributed to the injury, as any
I Liquors
one who sold or furnished liquors at the time of
the intoxication is liable for any and all damages sustained.
As the court says with regard to the liquor furnished, "it
is wholly immaterial whether it be the first or last drink":
Supreme Court of Nebraska in Jobnson v. Carlson, 95 N.
W. 788. Compare Kercow v. Bauer, i5 Neb. 15o.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS.

The Supreme Court of Delaware holds in Lane v. Lane,
55 Atlantic, 184, that the law of the domicile of the testator governs, as against the law of the domicile
w1Is:
Powe of
of the person to whom he gives by will a power
AppolneuLt
of appointment, in determining whether the
donee's will is an execution of the power. Applying this
principle, the court holds that a will of a testator domiciled
in Pennsylvania, disposing of all his "estate, real and personal, of whaiever kind and wheresoever situate," is not
an execution of the power contained in a will made by a
testator domiciled in Delaware, authorizing the former
testator to dispose of by will the principal, the income of
which was given to him for life, though under the law of
Pennsylvania it would be a valid execution. See Andrews
v. Emnot, 2 Bro. Ch. 297.

CONNECTING CARRIERS.

In Beede v. Wisconsin Cnt. Ry. Co., 95 N. W. 454, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that where goods have
Scaled Cs

been transported by several connecting car-

riers, and they are shown to have been in good
condition when delivered to the first carrier, but damaged
when delivered to the last carrier, the burden is on it to
show that the loss did not result from any cause for which
it was responsible, even though the goods were transported in through sealed cars. Compare Schriver v. Railway Co., 24 Minn. 5O6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In re Pringle,72 Pac. 864, the Supreme Court of Kansas
holds that a person who takes orders from samples for
Iatrste

C,mmerce

goods which he engages to deliver, and which
are to be shipped into the state from another

state, is not engaged in interstate commerce, when
such orders are not transmitted to such other state,
or filled there, but are filled from goods, not in the original
package of importation, sent to him in bulk, C. 0. D., from
such other state; and therefore a license tax may be imposed upon a man so engaged. Compare with this case
Enert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296.

686

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

A recent law of North Dakota substituted the penitentiary for the county jail as the place of confinement pendE pit a ts ing execution, and directed that executions
Law
should thereafter take place within the penitentiary walls. The Supreme Court of that state holds in
State v. Rooney, 95 N. W. 513, that this does not operate
to increase the punishment of one convicted of murder in
the first degree, with the death penalty affixed; nor is it a
change of the punishment to the disadvantage of the prisoner, and therefore it is not an ex post facto law.
CORPORATIONS.

With two judges dissenting, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky holds in Dietrich v. Rothenberger, 75 S. W. 27!,
Liabilty of that if the directors of a corporation engage in
DImectors
a business not within its corporate powers,
and, in so doing, .waste or lose the corporate assets, they
are personally liable.
COURTS.

In Ex parte Conley, 75 S. W. 3oi, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas holds that the force of a decision of an
Deslon as intermediate appellate court as an authority
Authority
is destroyed by a holding of the Supreme Court
that the questions passed upon were not involved in the
case. One judge dissents, relying on the case of Norman
v. ThoMpson, 72 S. W. (Texas), 64.

DEEDS.

The Supreme Court of Indiana deals in St. Clairv. Marquell, 67 N. E. 693, with the perplexed question of what
rIlvery is sufficient to constitute a delivery of a deed
and holds that where the owner of land executed a deed thereof, and placed it in an envelope and gave
it to a third person, telling him to deliver it after the grantor's death to grantee, though the one to whom the deed
was delivered was not told its nature, the delivery was
binding and a return of the envelope and contents subsequently to the grantor did not affect the title conveyed.
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DIVORCE.-

The question of what constitutes cruelty sufficient to
entitle one to a divorce seems to recur 'continually. In.
Ring v. Ring, 44 S. E. 861, the Supreme Court
€ oe
of Georgia holds that it is the willful infliction
of pain bodily or mental such as reasonably justifies apprehension of danger to life, limb or health. It is therefore held in the particular case that the habitual and intemperate use of morphine, unaccompanied by any conduct coming within the above definition, is not such cruel
treatment as the law recognizes as ground for a divorce.
The intention to wound, it is stated, is a necessary element
of the cruel treatment for which a divorce is allowed.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Dakis v. Dakin, 95 N. W. 781, that a husband who requires his wife to
live with him in the home of his mother, who
treats the wife with extreme cruelty, cannot
defend an action for divorce brought by the wife on the
ground that he himself was not guilty of the acts of cruelty.
complained of. By allowing third parties, to abuse andmistreat his wife, and refusing to provide her with another
home, he becomes legally answerable for the cruel treatment. See Day v. Day, So N. W. 979.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds in Bartlett
v. Gilcreast, 55 Atlantic, i89, that the owner of an undimorttage by vided half interest in realty, who receives a
Grantee
conveyance of the other half, which is fraudulent toward creditors, and who then mortgages the premises, cannot complain of a ruling holding the mortgage a
lien only on her original interest.

GUARDTAN AND WARD.

In Dudley v. Rice, 95 N. W. 936, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin holds that where the bond of the guardian of a
Guardian's lunatic was conditioned to pay over the
Bond
amount found due on the settlement either
with the county court or with the lunatic, if of sound
mind, it was enforceable as a voluntary obligation, though

0m
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GUARDIAN AND WARD (Continued).

the court had no jurisdiction of the guardianship proceedings, so that it was invalid as a statutory bond. Compare
with this case, which presents a good discussion of the
point involved, Conant v. Newton, 126 Mass. i o.
Where a father and mother were Roman Catholics, their
child, when committed to the care of a guardRetgions
Education of ian, must be brought up as a Roman Catholic:
Ward
In re Jacquet, 82 New York Supplement, 986.

HOMICIDE.

A husband has the legal right to the company and custody of his wife and child, and the wife's father has no auJastoficalon thority to keep her from him; and if it is necessary for the husband to kill the wife's father
to prevent the latter's killing him or taking his wife and
child away from him, and thus endangering him in life or
serious injury, he would be justified: Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas in Cole v. State, 75 S. W. 527.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In a prosecution for homicide, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas holds in Moore v. State, 75 S.W. 497,
that it was competent for the state to ask defendant as a witness whether he had married
the prosecuting witness on the day before the trial, for the
purpose of showing that the defendant married her for the
purpose of suppressing her testimony.
With two judges dissenting, the Appellate Court of Indiana holds in Field v. Campbell, 67 N. E. io4o, that
where a husband and wife execute a mortgage
including her separate estate to indemnify his
sureties, and she subsequently obtains a loan on other separate property to relieve her land from the mortgage,
which, by her election not to defend against it, has become
a valid lien, she cannot defeat the subsequent mortgage on.
the ground that it was executed to secure her husband's
debts, as the consideration of the mortgage was the release
of a subsisting lien, which was a valid consideration. Compare with this case Field v. Noblett, 154 Ind. 36o.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds in State v. West,
95 N. W. 521, that the rule that neither husband nor wife
Witness .:
can testify for or against the other (the comcOmPetency mon law rule being still in force on this point
in Wisconsin) is confined to cases where the testimony, if
given, would be by one directly for or against the other in
a suit to which such other is a party, and hence does not
render a husband incompetent to testify as to the fact of
marriage and incriminating circumstances in a criminal
prosecution of another.
In two.recent cases it is held that at the common law the
wife had no property right in the performance of the marital duties on the part of her husband, and thereAlnatio
of Husbad's fore no right to sue for the alienation of his
Affections
affections. The first of these is Lonstorf v.
Lonstorf, 95 N. W. (Wis.) 961, where it is held that this
has not been changed by any of the married women's statutes. From this decision two judges dissent. The second
case is Hodge v. Wetzler, 55 Atlantic (N. J.), 49, where
the same result is reached by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in a unanimous decision.
INJUNCTION.

In Kentucky the law makes it the duty of all judges of
courts on being informed that a prize-fight is about to take
Prize,
place to suppress and prevent the same, and in
fighting
doing so, to exercise all the powers vested in
them for the prevention of crimes. Construing this statute the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Commonwalth v. McGovern, 75 S. W. 261, that this act authorizes
a Court of Equity in a suit by the commonweathto enjoin
one from permitting the holding of a prize-fight on his
premises, on the ground that such a use of his property
will constitute a public nuisance, though it cannot grant
an injunction against the principals in the contemplated
prize-fight, nor those connected with them as managers,
trainers, etc., since the process of the -criminal courts is
regarded as adequate to prevent the fight by the arrest and
prosecution of the parties concerned. The case is interesting on account of the broad prir.ciple underlying it.
Three judges dissent.

6^
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INJUNCTION (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Braasch v.
Cemetery Ass'n of the Evangelical Lutheran Christ. Soc.,
Buial
95 N. W. 646, that a burial ground near dwellings is not necessarily a nuisance, and the
Grounds
court will only interfere and enjoin its use on clear and
convincing proof of probable injury; for instance, that it
was so situated that the burial of the dead there will injure
life or health either by corrupting the surrounding atmosphere or the water of wells or springs.
INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds in Opits v.
Karel, 95 N. W. 948, that a woman has an insurable interest in the life of the man whom she has conInsurable
Interet tracted to marry. This is on the ground that
the one party "has a reasonable right to expect some pecuniary advantage from the continuance of the life of the
other or to fear a loss from his death."

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The relation of lessor and lessee arises out of contract,
and, where there is neither express warranty nor deceit,
Condition
the latter cannot maintain an action against
o Prs=lse the former on account of the condition of the
premises hired: Supreme Court of Ohio in Shinkle, Wilson &-Kreis Co. v. Birney & Seymour, 67 N. E. 715. Compare Gott v. Gandy, 2 E. & B. 845.
LIBEL

The Supreme Court of California holds in People v. Seeicy, 72 Pac. 834, that in a prosecution for libel it was not
Function ot error to charge that the constitutional provisJury
ion that the jury have a right to determine the
law and fact did not place them above the law, or confer
on them the lawful right to decide as they saw fit, regardless of the law; that if they could say on their oaths that
they knew the law better than the court, they had the
right to do so, but before assuming such responsibility
they should be sure they were not acting from caprice or
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LIB EL (Continued).

prejudice, and that they were not controlled by their wills,
but from a deep and confident conviction that the court
was wrong and they were right.
LICENSES.

In Dodge v. Johnson, 67 N. E. 56o, plaintiff and defendant were adjoining land owners and had entered into and
executed an oral agreement wherebythe former
Executed
ULce,:
purchased a six-inch strip of land from the latRectuoa ter, and bore one-half the expense of constructing a party wall and stairway to buildings constructed by
each of them, and the latter permitted the stairway to be
constructed wholly on his premises, providing an entrance
to the upper floors of plaintiff's building; and, in reliance on
defendant's agreement, plaintiff provided no other means
of ingress or egress. The defendant subsequently blocked
up this entrance, against plaintiff's protest, and thus compelled an abandonment of the upper stories of the plaintiff's building. On these facts the Appellate Court of Indiana holds that the plaintiff, having acted on the license
to make use of defendant's premises for the purpose of
access to his building, it was irrevocable, and defendant
was estopped to question its continued use and was liable
in damages for the obstruction thereof. Compare with
this case Brauns v. Glesige, i3o Ind. 167.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Dobbins v.
City of Los Angeles, 72 Pac. 97o, that an ordinance makProhibiting
ing it unlawful to erect or maintain any works
Gawta
for the manufacture of gas, or any tank or
other receptacle for the storage of gas, within certain limits, is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the city,
and the fact that prior to the adoption of such ordinance
A had commenced to erect works under a permit of the
Board of Fire Commissioners of the city, did not constitute an express contract by the city to allow him to erect
and maintain the works: that in fact the city could not
thus estop itself from making and enforcing proper police
regulations. Three judges dissent. See and compare
Hyde Park v. The FertilizingCo., 97 U. S. 659.
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NEGLIGENCE.

The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey holds in
Miller v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 55 Atlantic, 245,
eltow
that a flagman of one train and the engineer of
Servants
the same company are engaged in a common
employment, and are fellow servants within the rule exempting the master from liability. The same court holds
in Campbell v. T. A. Gillespie Co., 55 Atlantic, 276, that
where the negligence of the master concurs with that of
the servant in producing injury to a fellow servant, the
master is liable; and therefore the burden is on the master,
where such negligence is alleged to have arisen from the
furnishing of improper tools, to show that he had furnished
the proper tools, which the servant might have used.
Compare Pauhnierv. Railway Co., 34 N. J. Law, x5i.

PARENT AND CHILD.

In Wisner v. Osborne, 55 Atlantic, 51, it appeared that
an insolvent debtor permitted his infant son who lived with
creditors a him to contract for wages to be paid to the
Pather
son. These wages were invested in the stock
of a corporation and an attempt was made by the creditors
of the father to subject this stock to their claims. The
Court of Chancery of New Jersey refuses to permit this,
holding that whether solvent or insolvent the father may
permit his minor child to receive his own earnings for his
own use. Compare with this case Costello v. ProspectBrewing Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 557.

PHYSICIANS.

In Grattop v. Rowheder, 95 N. W. 679, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska holds that one who calls a physician
for a member of his family, though not a relative, is liable for the physician's services, rendered without notice that the party who calls
him does not intend to make himself liable for such services. As to what constitutes a member of the family, it is
held that a woman about seventy years of age, who lives in
a family for nine years, performing such services as she is
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PHYSICIANS (Continued).

able, for which she receives the necessaries of life, is a member of the family within the meaning of the foregoing rule.
RES JUDICATA.

By divorce granted in New Mexico, the custody of a
child was given to the father, with permission for it to
visit the mother for a month each year, the
Foreign
Dccre
visits to be made within New Mexico, and the
mother not to remove the child therefrom: the court having jurisdiction of the parties, including the child. The
mother took the child to Texas, and plaintiff, the father,
brought habeas corpus to obtain its custody. The Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Wilson v. Elliott, 75
S. W. 368, that the decree determined all facts existing
prior to its date in favor of the plaintiff's right to its custody, and only such facts could be considered to disturb
that adjudicated right which might have come into existence since that time, such as evidence of changed conditions of the parties bearing on their fitness and the best
interests of the child.
STREET RAILROADS.

The laws of Massachusetts forbid the granting of any
location for the track of any street railway in certain localities, except in ways in which special space shall
Additional
Servitude
have been reserved prior to-the location of the
track, and except within the limits of such reserved space,
and authorizing the selectmen of the town to lay out such
space. In Eustis v. Milton St. Ry. Co., 67 N. E. 663, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that the
act is not unconstitutional on the ground that it authorizes the imposition of an additional servitude without compensation. The court lays down the principle that "in determining whether an additional servitude is imposed by
the authorization of a new kind of use, the question is not
whether the legislature or the public authorities foresaw
and contemplated the particular use in question, but
whether it is fairly included in the purposes for which the
property was taken by the public." Compare AttorneyGeneral v. Metropolitan Railroad, 125 Mass. 515.
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TAXATION.

The conflict of state taxation with the operations of the
central government presents one of its phases In re People's
Bank of Vermont, Ill., 67 N. E. 777, where the
United
Supreme Court of Illinois holds that where the
states
facts tend to show that a purchase of United
Bonds
States bonds by a bank was for the purpose of evading taxation-the bonds being purchased immediately before and
sold immediately after the date as of which its property
was listed for taxation, and never being taken into its
possession, but left on special deposit in a distant bankthe transaction may be regarded as fraudulent, and the
bank be assessed with the amou,,t of money invested in
such bonds. See Shotwecll v. Moore, i29 U. S. 590.

TESTAMENTARY TRUST.

In Wirth v. Wirth, 67 N. E. 657, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts holds that legatees of a testator,
one of whom is a minor (laughter, are not enca"In
titled to determine a testamentary trust,
02
Rsiness

whereby the personal representative is author-

ized to carry on testator's liquor business for their benefit.
and tocompel a conveyance to them of the property in
specie, so that they may. carry on the business for themselves, as neither the daughter nor her guardian could engage in such business. Compare with this case Clark v.
Garfield, 8 Allen, 407.

WATER COURSES.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Singleton v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 72 Pac. 786, that a channel
Obstrucian

or other depression in the ground, forming the

bank of a river, through which water escapes
and flows from the river only at times of high water in the
river, does not constitute a natural water course, and obstructing the flow of water therein from the river, to the
injury of another, is damnum absque injuria. Compare
with this case C.. K. & N. Ry.Co. v. Steck. 51 Kans. 737.

